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Symposium: Computers, Data Banks,
and Individual Privacyt
The following symposium transcript is intended to explore
the possibility of National Data Banks and the various
problems and dangers of such systems. The participants
discuss the need for improving the accessibility of data
and the countervailing personal privacy considerations.
I. Richard Ruggles On the needs and values of
data banks.
II. John de J. Pemberton, Jr. -On the dangers, legal as-
pects and remedies.
III. Arthur R. Miller _____ On proposals and require-
ments for solutions.
IV. Messrs. Ruggles, Pember-
ton & Miller General Comments
I. ON THE NEEDS AND VALUES OF DATA BANKSt
Richard Ruggles*
A. Tim NATURE OF PRIVAcY
The privacy of the individual has been profoundly affected
by the structural changes which have been taking place in Amer-
ican society during the last 50 years. Increasing urbanization
and mobility have significantly altered the relation of indi-
viduals to each other. Proverbially, anything that happened to
anyone in a small town immediately became public knowledge.
The movement of the population to large urban centers and in-
creased mobility and ease of communication has, oddly enough,
increased privacy in certain dimensions. Neighbors in apartment
houses often do not know each other, and the automobile and the
telephone have made it possible to choose one's friends without
regard to proximity.
The change in the family structure has also altered in-
dividual relationships. The child is separated from the family at
an early age and spends much of his time in school and extra-
curricular activities with other children. The husband corn-
f From the Fourth Cohen Ethics Symposium held on May 2, 1968
at the University of Minnesota School of Business Administration and
sponsored by the Merrill Cohen Memorial Fund and the Graduate
School of Bnsiness Administration.
* Prr 'essor, Department of Economics, Yale University.
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mutes to work and the wife engages in social or economic ac-
tivities of her own choosing. Grandparents and other relatives
generally do not live with the family unit, but instead maintain
separate households supported by social security, pensions, and
other assets saved up over their lifetimes. In fact, one of the
most frequent complaints of grandparents is that they never
hear from their children or know what is going on. Once the
children go off to college or to work, they withdraw from the
family unit and begin to develop their own groups of friends
and associates.
Personal privacy in these terms has been substantially in-
creased, mainly because fewer people are interested in knowing
about an individual's private life. This unconcern, of course, has
its disadvantages as well as its advantages, and does not neces-
sarily reflect an improvement.
On the other hand, at the same time that the depersonaliza-
tion of society has tended toward increasing privacy, there has
been a substantial increase in recorded information about the
individual. This recording starts at birth and continues until
death. There are many types of public records, and many of
them are open to anyone who wishes to consult them. If one
buys real estate, it must be registered. City directories list the
names of individuals and businesses. Phone books provide peo-
ple's names, addresses, and phone numbers. The individual wish-
ing to obtain a driver's license must provide identification in-
formation, sometimes even fingerprints and photographs. If he
receives income, he must make out an income tax return. His
employers must report information about him to social security.
More recently, medicare has added to the records to be filed.
In addition, various government organizations keep their
own records. The police maintain files on individuals with
whom they come in contact. The FBI may investigate any in-
dividual for security clearances or suspected criminal activities.
The army maintains records on all individuals who pass through
it. Schools keep records on all students. Employers maintain
files on employees, and credit agencies build up credit informa-
tion on individuals and businesses.
The existence of all these records has produced a feeling of
insecurity which is easily understandable. The individual is
afraid that information, or what is perhaps even more serious,
misinformation, may be used against him without his knowledge.
The present concern with the right to privacy has two quite
different aspects. On the one hand, the increasing concern over
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civil rights has made it glaringly evident that in the past the
normal process of operation of the society has violated the privacy
of many individuals. In many instances police practice in in-
vestigating crime or handling minor civil disturbances was not
overly concerned with the protection of individual privacy. Re-
cently, greater care has been taken to protect the individual's
rights in such situations, despite charges that such action is ty-
ing the hands of law enforcement officers. There is little doubt
that this concern is a reflection of increased awareness that
less privileged groups have a right to be treated in the same way
as the more privileged groups.
On the other hand, the privileged groups are seeing their
privacy eroded by the increasing information requirements of a
growing bureaucracy. Wealthy individuals may resent having to
report all of their financial dealings to the government, and
pure food laws, safety standards, fair employment practices, etc.,
are taken by many to be an invasion of privacy. There is a
feeling that an individual should be free to run his own af-
fairs as he sees fit without the interference of the government.
B. THE USE mm MIsusE OF INFORMATION
It is quite obvious that the operation of our modern society
does require a vast amount of information. The questions which
must be answered about this information relate not only to
whether specific information should exist, but also to how it is
used-or misused. Some information or misinformation may
be useless or even harmful, and some information which is essen-
tial and useful is subject to misuse. It is in these contexts that
it is proper to talk about the invasion of the privacy of the in-
dividual.
In certain areas we frankly recognize that information is in
the public domain. Thus, when an individual provides a bio-
graphical sketch for Who's Who, he is releasing this informa-
tion to the public. Similarly, if he publishes articles or books,
his name will be associated with this material in the future.
Bibliographies are part of the information in the public domain.
Even listing one's phone number in the telephone book pro-
vides a public record open to all. Unfortunately even such pub-
lic recording of information does permit misuse, as when ad-
vertising concerns build address lists from public sources for
mass mailings or telephone solicitation. Recently, court cases
have indicated that for certain classes of mail-e.g., obscene
matter-a person can have his name removed from such private
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lists. Many people would gladly remove their names from all
junk mail and telephone solicitation lists if it were possible to
do so. But few are willing to go to the length of asking for an
unlisted phone.
In other areas individuals give up privacy quite willingly
because they are assured that those to whom they give informa-
tion are working on their behalf. Thus an individual will re-
veal to his doctor or lawyer information which he considers to
be of a highly confidential nature. Our legal system recognizes
that such information is privileged and need not be divulged
under any circumstances.
In still other areas the individual provides information be-
cause he recognizes that it is a necessary part of the system.
Few would argue that motor vehicle license information is un-
desirable. Social security information is necessary for the social
security system to operate. Even income taxes are a necessary
part of modern life, but release of income tax information for
any other public or private use may well constitute a serious
invasion of privacy.
Besides government records, schools and employers main-
tain records on those associated with them. Again, these are
recognized as necessary, despite the fact that such records may
have an important role in determining the individual's future.
In some of the larger companies, unions have recognized the
importance of records on employees, and much of the grievance
machinery relates directly to what ds permitted to be put in the
record of an individual. In the case of school records, their use,
for instance, for determining draft status has been hotly con-
tested as an invasion of privacy.
There are other areas of information about which individuals
are considerably more suspicious, and where the invasion of
privacy is much greater. We are assured that for purposes of
national security certain government agencies must have the
power to interview individuals about other individuals, and
collect information in considerable detail from any source pos-
sible. The question of the use of eavesdropping, wiretapping,
etc., to obtain this information has been raised, but the content
of the information itself has not been seriously challenged.
Similarly, credit agencies compile information on millions
of individuals and furnish such information to any private group
desiring to know about the credit-worthiness of an individual,
without any control over the sources, methods or quality of the
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information obtained. Unfortunately, the individual does not
have the opportunity to confront or correct the rumors and mis-
information filed in his dossiers. There can be no doubt that
this situation constitutes a major invasion of individual privacy,
and should not be tolerated.
C. TnE NEED FOR INFoRmATiON ABOUT OuR SociET
The information needs of society are not, however, confined
to the day-to-day operating uses where information about par-
ticular individuals is used for administrative actions concerning
those individuals. To an increasing extent, we need informa-
tion about the operation of the society itself in order to under-
stand the social and economic problems which exist in our na-
tion, and to devise policies aimed at changing underlying con-
ditions.
In the physical sciences the importance of information has
long been understood. Scientific laboratories exist in order to
generate data which can promote the further development of
scientific knowledge. The vehicles which we launch into space
have as one of their primary missions the sending back of vast
amounts of information to enlarge our knowledge. The science
of oceanography represents a systematic attempt to assemble in-
formation about the ecology of this area of our natural environ-
ment. In recent years the observations of weather for meteor-
ological purposes have produced a vast flood of data that has
greatly increased our ability to predict weather and our knowl-
edge in this area. Much of the acceleration in the pace of tech-
nological change is directly attributable to the ability of scien-
tists to gain access to the kind of information required for a
better understanding of major scientific questions.
The operation of the social and economic system has gen-
erated masses of data concerned with the day-to-day function-
ing of the system, and some facets of this data have been used to
develop economic constructs. Our national accounts use these
constructs to tell us about such things as the rate of economic
growth, the movement of prices, and the gold drain. In addition,
various government agencies publish masses of aggregated sta-
tistical data, much of which is difficult to comprehend but
which nevertheless does throw partial light on some aspects of
some problems.
The social scientist, unlike the physical scientist, has not
been oriented to the systematic use of information. Social sci-
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ence disciplines are largely based on theoretical structures that
are non-operational and rest for the most part on intuitive feel-
ing and casual empiricism. Where empirical research is under-
taken, it generally tends to concern itself with observations of
global aggregates or with very small samples of data to which
the social scientist may have obtained access.
This situation is not of the social scientists' own choosing.
The kinds of information required for an understanding of the
social system have not been available, and prior to the develop-
ment of the computer would not have been usable even if
they had been available. The net result, however, is that we have
been woefully ignorant of the nature and operation of our
economic and social system. For example, we do not know very
much about the incidence and nature of poverty. Until recently,
the image of the poverty group in the public mind was associ-
ated with laziness and lack of moral fiber, and poverty was con-
sidered by those not directly concerned to be largely of a per-
son's own choosing. The civil and social disorders of the last
several years have made clear that these views are not in ac-
cord with the facts. It has become evident that the poor come
from initially disadvantaged groups, and that special efforts
will have to be made to correct the underlying conditions. But
we still do not really know who the poor are in terms of their
underlying characteristics, and without such knowledge, it is
difficult to develop policies which will be successful in eradicat-
ing poverty.
Similarly, we do not really understand the process of infla-
tion, despite our attempt to design fiscal and monetary policies
to control it. For example, we do not know whether prices
rise in response to rising demand or to rising wage costs. Our
knowledge of what causes wage increases is similarly obscure.
Do wages rise because of a low unemployment rate and labor
scarcity or are wage increases determined by a collective bar-
gaining process where increases in the cost of living or high
profits are the main considerations?
Our knowledge of structural unemployment is also deficient.
To what extent does general prosperity provide employment for
the less advantaged groups? To what extent can retraining
programs cure structural unemployment, or are regional develop-
ment programs required to provide employment opportunities?
Recently, the minimum wage rate has been raised, and the charge
has been made by some that this in itself will cause further un-
employment among those who would be worth hiring at the
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lower rate but are too costly at the higher rate. Comprehensive
basic information is needed before the impact of minimum wage
legislation in helping to alleviate poverty can be evaluated. More
recently, proposals for a negative income tax have been made,
but again it is difficult to see what effect such policies are
likely to have without highly detailed information about the pre-
cise economic and social conditions of those who would be af-
fected.
Another example is the problem of the aged. It is obvious
that the lot of the aged has considerably improved over the last
20 years, but in spite of this many still live in what is es-
sentially poverty. In order to design future legislation, it is
important to know whether the increasing levels of income and
the spread of private pension and health insurance plans coupled
with the present social security system and medicare will in
fact substantially reduce the problem of poverty among the aged
in the next decade or so.
In giving examples of the types of problems which need in-
vestigation so that we can improve the society we live in, I have
mentioned only some of the major economic problems. Other
social scientists-psychologists, political scientists, and sociolo-
gists-could suggest many other problems relating to such things
as civil rights, mental health, and crime-all of which may re-
quire highly detailed and comprehensive information about our
society.
At the present time only fragments of economic and social
data exist in any one place, and access to even this information
for research purposes is difficult. The individual government
agencies are essentially operating organizations concerned with
carrying out specific tasks, and are generally unwilling to per-
mit their current operations to be disrupted for research pur-
poses. What is needed is to bring together the data from many
different sources so that they can be made readily accessible for
research purposes, and so that individual pieces can be fitted to-
gether to provide a comprehensive picture of the operation of our
society. Accordingly, it has been recommended that a National
Data Center be established which would be the repository for
the basic data of the different government agencies, making these
data available for use in economic and social research.
From the point of view of the government, the establishment
of a National Data Center might well reduce the amount of in-
formation which would have to be obtained from individuals
and businesses. Under the present decentralized system, each
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government agency obtains its own information so that individu-
als and businesses often find themselves providing slightly dif-
ferent versions of essentially the same information time and time
again. The establishment of a National Data Center might well
reduce the redundancy of the statistical system, and at the same
time improve the consistency and coherence of the information,
thus providing better information at lower cost to both the in-
dividual respondent and the government.
D. THE NEED TO CONTROL THE COLLECTION AND USE OF INFORMATION
The threat to individual privacy through the collection and
misuse of information exists irrespective of whether information
is brought together in one central location. Some of the most
flagrant abuses that have occurred in recent periods are due to
government agencies demanding what is essentially improper in-
formation. In one case school children were given questionnaires
asking whether their parents quarreled. Employees of some gov-
ernment agencies were asked detailed questions concerning their
political views and their personal affairs.
Unfortunately, at the present time many government bodies
conduct their data gathering activities with considerable inde-
pendence and little supervision. They have considerable free-
dom in hiring investigators to collect information from other
government agencies, private business, and private individuals,
and they are free to exchange information with other groups.
It is small wonder, therefore, that a sense of uneasiness
about privacy exists. Furthermore, as already indicated, the
individual does not have access to information about himself, so
that the misinformation produced can never be corrected. One
should not be under the illusion that the perpetuation of the
existing highly decentralized system without controls provides
any protection for the individual. The greatest harm that is
done to the individual is in precisely those agencies and private
organizations where information collection is unhampered and
secretive, and the information is used against the individual in
terms of decisions which seriously affect him.
In contrast with this quite unhappy situation, those agencies
concerned with the systematic compilation of data operate quite
differently. The Census Bureau, for example, has no operating
functions and therefore takes no actions of any nature with re-
spect to individuals. All of its records, furthermore, are confi-
dential. No other government agency, congressional commit-
tee, or other body has access to the individual records of the
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Census Bureau. This confidentiality rule has been upheld by
the Supreme Court. Thus, for example, the Internal Revenue
Service cannot even get the lists of individuals or businesses
covered by the Census, since this might turn up names of in-
dividuals who have not filed tax returns. Congressional com-
mittees conducting investigations cannot use information pro-
vided by the individual or business to the Census Bureau, even
if there are copies in the files of the business. Every business
and individual, furthermore, knows precisely what information
is held by the Census Bureau. Public hearings are held on the
questions which are to be asked on Census forms, and there is
public debate as to what specific items should be included.
If we are to correct the present abuses which do constitute
invasion of individual privacy, the system of decentralized data
files should not be allowed to continue. Explicit consideration
should be given to precisely what kinds of information different
government agencies should be permitted to gather and keep, and
steps should be taken to see that the confidentiality of informa-
tion is protected and its misuse prevented.
The only systematic way to undertake such a reform is to set
up an independent non-operating agency specifically concerned
with the task of monitoring the information system and pre-
venting its abuse. One of the first requirements would be to
exclude from the files of all government agencies improper in-
formation which is now entered. Although the complaint would
be heard that this would result in the loss of important sensitive
material needed for crime detection or security purposes, this
same charge has been made in the past with respect to the ques-
tion of the admissibility of certain types of evidence in the courts.
Thus, for example, confessions obtained improperly have been
ruled inadmissible. In similar manner, casual rumors obtained
by interviews with neighbors might also be considered improper
for inclusion in an individual file.
In any event, as has been suggested by both Professor
Charles Reich at Yale and Mr. Pemberton, every individual
should have a right to see the information contained in files
relating to him. The independent non-operating agency should
in fact be concerned with enforcing compliance by government
bodies with standard codes developed to protect the rights of
individual privacy.
At the same time, it would be possible for such an agency to
bring together for statistical and research purposes the basic
files of the different data-gathering agencies. This does not
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mean, of course, that anyone in any agency could push the pro-
verbial button and get any information he wished. The Internal
Revenue Service still should not be able to get lists of names of
individuals who respond to Census enumerators. Similarly, in-
dividual tax return information should not be made available to
other government agencies.
For statistical and research purposes, however, it should be
possible to tap the basic information of all agencies in order to
further our knowledge about the conditions and operation of our
society. Thus, for example, although medical records are of the
most sensitive nature, studies of cancer in relation to air pollu-
tion might well find it useful to process medical and demo-
graphic data together in the interests of scientific research.
In conclusion, I would like to reiterate the following major
points. First, the existing situation is one in which there has
been a substantial encroachment on individual privacy by many
public and private organizations. Second, much of the failure of
our social and economic institutions to cope with the major prob-
lems facing the nation is directly attributable to the inade-
quacy of the information relating to our society. Third, a con-
tinuation of the present highly decentralized information sys-
tem will not cure present abuses, but will prevent the integra-
tion of information required for future social and economic de-
velopment. Finally, an independent non-operating institution
should be developed which is charged with the proper develop-
ment of economic and social information and with protection of
individual privacy through restricting access to information and
the elimination of improper information.
If we do create such a National Data Center, which can not
only provide the necessary base for research on the central
economic and social problems now confronting us but can also
provide a safeguard against encroaching bureaucracy, we will be
taking a major step forward.
II. ON THE DANGERS, LEGAL ASPECTS AND REMEDIES
John de J. Pemberton, Jr.**
I want to underscore the significance of what I have heard:
the advocacy of the use of modem and efficient means of gather-
ing, storing, and retrieving data, to deal with social problems;
and at the same time the advocacy of a new and increasing
* * Executive Director, American Civil Liberties Union.
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sensitivity to the invasion of rights of individuals occasioned by
any system for gathering, storing and retrieving information.
Professor Ruggles is right, the problems are there now.
They do not arise out of the introduction of efficient means of
dealing with data. In fact, we may, as his National Data Bank
proposal suggests, become more systematic in our methodology
of protecting the rights of individuals just because we do move
from inefficient to more efficient means of dealing with data.
But we shall have to be determined to do so, for the hearings
conducted in Congress on the Budget Bureau's data bank pro-
posal in 1966 and 1967 have suggested that many proposals in
this area have been insensitive to individual rights.
Simply, I think two major rights of an individual are apt to
be violated by someone gathering information about him; and it
may be particularly dangerous if it is the government that does
so. The first is the obvious invasion of his right of privacy. I
am not speaking about the danger that the information gathered
about him may be inaccurate and unfairly prejudicial. I am
saying that even accurate information may be unfair or an un-
warranted invasion of his privacy, because it is information
which he is entitled to keep to himself and those to whom he
intentionally discloses it.
Take a young man in the 1950's who, in his student days in
the 1930's, had joined an organization, later discovered to be a
Communist front, and had been immature in his judgments and
about his continued political association with that group. We
saw throughout the 1950's the unfairness that could occur to him
from the inferences the public drew from what might have been
perfectly accurate information as to what he did in the 1930's.
Absent systematic methods of surveillance of other people's
political activity, as well as storage and effective retrieval of that
information, the ordinary course of a healthy democracy has
been that people grew up politically without having what they
themselves later came to judge as political mistakes live as skele-
tons in their closets to haunt them indefinitely. At least such
mistakes did not haunt them in such irrelevant matters as pri-
vate employment which was unrelated to their political ac-
tivity.
The other danger is one related to inaccuracy of information.
It is the danger that is represented by the experience many
people have with the gathering of credit information: Anyone
in the world who is somewhat persistent can find a great deal of
credit information about you, except you yourself. If you try to
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find a credit report on yourself you may have enormous diffi-
culty. There is the example of the New York legislator who
was denied a mortgage loan and persisted in requesting in-
formation from the bank to which he applied until he learned
that a credit rating bureau in New York reported him to be a
bad risk because of a default judgment that had been taken
against him. Only perhaps because he was a state legislator
could he bring enough pressure to bear to get accurate informa-
tion on what the credit bureau was saying about him. It turned
out that another man with a similar name did indeed have a
default judgment rendered against him. But unless he knew
what was in that file, it was impossible for the error to be
corrected. It was impossible for him to do anything to prevent
being harmed by inaccurate information which was being cir-
culated about him.
All of these problems are present in existing data collec-
tion and dissemination systems. What we fear, perhaps unrea-
sonably, is the efficiency that may be introduced by modern
methods of collecting, storing and disseminating the informa-
tion.
In June, 1967, an enterprising reporter for Newsday maga-
zine decided that he wanted to find out what he could really
learn about somebody in one of the communities within the cir-
culation area of his magazine. He picked a name at random from
the telephone book, called the man and said, "Pd like'to use you
as the guinea pig in my experiment," telling him what the
experiment would be. "'Do you have any objections?" The man
said, "Oh no, there is nothing to worry about." He then spent
several weeks examining public records concerning this individ-
ual with whom he had no prior contact. After gathering the
material, the reporter published a profile and biography of this
otherwise anonymous individual living in the Newsday circula-
tion area. The man about whom he wrote the biography
screamed in pain, "where did you get that kind of information
about me?" Every item was in a public record. There were
birth records, marriage records, and health records. There were
records on his children kept by the educational system. There
was recorded financial data regarding his application for mort-
gages on his car and his home. He was a veteran of World War
II and had recorded his discharge papers. And yet this is only
part of the story that could have been collected with the kind of
central data bank that we are now discussing.
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What we seem to have done is rely on inefficiency to protect
our privacy-to protect us from these particular dangers-and we
suddenly realize that we can no longer do so. I agree with Pro-
fessor Ruggles, we ought not to have been relying upon it at all.
We are susceptible to injury by anyone who wants to work hard
enough to do so, and this will continue to be true unless we take
steps to discriminate among the kinds of information that are
gathered and stored.
That much can be done to improve the functioning of many
social programs was underscored by a recommendation of the
Research Division of United Planning Organization, a private
community action agency dealing with social problems and pov-
erty in some areas of Washington, D.C. It was suggested that
services important to the action components of the agency could
not be performed unless it was permitted to organize a genuine
data bank, which ultimately would have to be computerized in
order to handle the volume of information to be collected. Some-
thing short of a data bank would give the agency the capacity to
render some descriptive research services to the board of direc-
tors and the action planners of the organization, but would not
permit it to evaluate the kind of impact that they were making
on the community.
The information sources that would be available to such an
agency, in addition to their own inquiries-studies of the com-
munities or neighborhoods that they were operating in-would
include police records, records of the educational institutions,
welfare agencies and private agencies. Information so col-
lected might answer such questions as: Who are the school
dropouts? What is the relationship between dropouts, juvenile
arrest and juvenile court records? Yet, it would be easy to create
anonymity for such data by collecting all of it without identifi-
cation, or destroying the identification of individuals after it
was collected. However, this is not feasible when the data is to
be kept alive to show a moving profile of the neighborhoods
and communities that are being serviced by the agency, to show
whether new social conditions are changing the problems that
the agency is dealing with, or to show whether the actions of
the agency itself are having some impact, affirmative or nega-
tive, upon the various existing social problems. To keep the
information alive and current, it is necessary that new informa-
tion about the same individuals be introduced into the data.
As soon as this occurs, the possibility of destroying private in-
dividual identifications is eliminated. New information about
19681
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Johnny's relationships with the police cannot be introduced un-
less it is related to, or put in the same file or pigeon hole with
the old information about Johnny. How then, the Research
Division asked, are we going to do anything to protect the pri-
vacy of individuals? Are we not asking their consent to assem-
ble information that the police may have on them with informa-
tion that other sources may give us, despite great possibility of
injury to them as a result?
After several pages describing how this problem of protec-
tion was wrestled with, it was proposed that all information as-
sembled and kept be put on two decks of IBM cards, one deck
dealing with identification and another deck dealing with sub-
stantive information. The two decks would then be separately
put on computer tapes. A committee would control the identifi-
cation and substantive decks, and the tapes on which they were
placed, rather than any one man. Members of the committee
would have to act in concert in order to put together the sub-
stantive and the identification decks for purposes of adding or
abstracting information. This alternative was recommended
even though it would cost a fairly small organization an addi-
tional $6,000 in capital outlay and an additional $200 a month
to operate as compared to a nonprivacy-protecting system of
data collection and dissemination.
What I am suggesting is that only as the advocates of modern
methods of information storage and retrieval couple their advo-
cacy with concern for the individual's right of privacy, protec-
tion against false information, and confrontation of information
being stored about him and the opportunity to correct it-rights
that can only be protected with additional expense and delay-
will we have this kind of protection. I commend Professor
Ruggles for being such an advocate.
III. ON PROPOSALS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR
SOLUTIONS
Arthur R. Miller***
When I was invited to participate in this symposium, it was
suggested that my remarks occupy the "middle ground" be-
tween Professor Ruggles and Mr. Pemberton. Accordingly, in
*** Professor, School of Law, University of Michigan. Professor
Miller indicates that many of the ideas in his remarks before the sym-
posium will be set out in elaborated form in a forthcoming article in the
Michigan Law Review.
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thinking about today's session my plan had been to listen to my
symposium colleagues, synthesize the remarks of the preceding
speakers and then go on to formulate this so-called "middle
ground." Now that I have heard Professor Ruggles and Mr.
Pemberton, I find the "middle ground" fully occupied and feel
myself technologically unemployed. I thus would like to spend
my allotted time extemporizing to reinforce some of the points
previously made and perhaps indicate my own philosophical bias
in this debate.
The title of the symposium has the word "computer" in it,
and I think it would be well for all of us to leave the hall
later this afternoon with some concept of what it is that this
computer is capable of doing to us in the area of individual
privacy-in particular, what is so unique about the computer
that distinguishes it from the traditional manila folder?
The computer is a many-splendored animal. It is myopic to
think of it as little more than a high speed calculator with a
gland condition. It's much more than that. Modern informa-
tion transfer technology in time will prove to be the heart of a
new communications network, a communications network that
differs from many of the communication networks that we are
familiar with, such as telephones, telegraph, radio, television and
newspapers, only in technological and media terms. Accordingly,
the computer must be dealt with as a communications network.
Just as we decided over 30 years ago that we couldn't
tolerate airplanes flying randomly over the United States and
that we couldn't permit radio stations to broadcast indiscrimi-
nately and without regard to the question of allocating the radio
spectrum, so it is that we will shortly find, indeed I believe that
the FCC has already found, that we can't permit unregulated
computer transmissions, especially if computers are used to trans-
mit sensitive information over long distances to other computers
or data centers. This is not a fanciful concern. In this day of
Early Bird and Telstar satellites, we are capable of moving in-
formation from the great libraries and museums of Europe to
the United States on a computerized basis in a very short
period of time if we choose to do it. The future of global informa-
tion interchange is almost limitless.
But to focus more closely on the subject of today's sym-
posium, in what ways might this new technology with its many
wondrous uses pose a threat to individual privacy? Perhaps a
few examples of computer applications will present the computer-
privacy dilemma in a more graphic fashion. In a medical center
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in the South, doctors are implanting heart patients with sensors
that permit the patients' bodily functions to be monitored by
computer. The object, of course, is to develop some type of an
"early warning" system for the prediction of heart attacks.
The theory of the experiment is to try to ascertain what chemi-
cal or biological changes take place inside the human body im-
mediately before the onset of the attack so that the patient can
be treated before he is rendered moribund by the attack
itself.
Elsewhere, there are plans being formulated to provide every-
one with an identification number at birth. As a practical mat-
ter, most of us already have identification numbers that serve
a variety of purposes. Our social security number currently is
used to identify us for tax purposes, by the military, and in
many institutions of learning, including my own, it also serves as
a student identification number. The obviously desirable goal of
all this is to develop a system of record keeping and information
reporting that avoids much of the existing duplication that Pro-
fessor Ruggles alluded to, and to provide a central locale at
which all information can be accumulated about every in-
dividual, whether it pertains to social security, taxation, mili-
tary, immigration and naturalization, or medical condition. Thus,
the day may come when an American falling ill while away from
home will contact a local doctor in France or Japan who will
pick up his telephone, dial the patient's identification number,
and immediately be given his medical history so that the doctor
can be aided in diagnosing the problem and avoiding drug reac-
tions.
Wonderful! There is no doubt that these applications of
computer technology are socially desirable. But the same sen-
sors that can be implanted into the human body to develop a
medical early warning system can also be used in order to track
people, to monitor their movements, their activities, and in the
fullness of time, if we believe some of the modern theories about
thought and intelligence, to compute and determine what they
are thinking about, what their aggression level is, and what their
criminal potential might be at any particular moment in time.
It already has been suggested that we take advantage of the
fact that we keep convicted criminals incarcerated for long pe-
riods of time by analyzing their body chemistry and behavior
patterns. The object would be to permit the implantation of
sensors into these people upon their release from prison in order
to keep track of them as they move in society. Thus, when com-
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puter monitoring shows that they are undergoing a deviation
from their normal body chemistry or behavior pattern which
might signify an increase in their aggression potential, the po-
lice could be dispatched to prevent the subject from indulging
in any antisocial activity. Similarly, the identification number,
which can achieve so much in the way of record keeping effi-
ciency, also can act as the key to an individualized, computer-
based dossier that can constitute an informational leash around
our necks along the lines suggested earlier by Mr. Pemberton.
In short, I am suggesting that we are dealing with a prob-
lem of immense importance this afternoon. The basic thesis I
would like to leave with you is simply that given the large
stakes, we should not think simply in terms of the ethical or
moral implications of a National Data Center, or any other type
of a data center. We must recognize that we are dealing with a
new technology, whose applications are just beginning to be per-
ceived and whose capacity to deprive us of our privacy simply
cannot be measured in terms of existing systems or assumptions
about the immutability of the technology.
I should make one thing clear at this point. I do not oppose
data centers. I am overwhelmed by their capabilities; I am con-
cerned about their proliferation; but I think it is absolutely
ludicrous and unrealistic to advocate the elimination of a modern
technology that can carry out important governmental and non-
governmental operations simply because that technology might
be abused. Given the complexity of modern society, given the
society's commitment in terms of billions of dollars and bil-
lions of man hours in the fields of education, urban renewal,
social welfare, and natural resource development and allocation,
we simply have to face the fact that in order to effectuate
many of our programs we must have and be able to process
amounts of information that far exceed anything we have ever
contemplated dealing with before.
To draw a rough analogy, we are all cognizant of the destruc-
tive capability of the automobile. We know it can kill and maim
people. Nonetheless, no one seriously advocates the banning
of automobiles from the highway. Rather, the quest is to de-
velop a rational pattern of regulation of vehicles and operators
to ensure that we derive maximum social utility from the auto-
mobile at a minimum of social cost in terms of injury to per-
sons and property. I suggest that this should be the goal of
those who interest themselves in the question of computers,
computer technology, and the right of individual privacy-ra-
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tional regulation of computers and computer applications in those
contexts in which individual privacy might be affected.
Professor Ruggles made a very, very cogent point which was
seconded by Mr. Pemberton, and is worth repeating. The prob-
lem of privacy and information gathering has always been with
us; indeed it is a natural and inevitable by-product of a literate
society. The problem simply has not been focused upon before
because of our preoccupation with physical surveillance-the
snooper, the guy who rummages through your house or office
at night, the fellow who trails you on the street, the user of
the parabolic microphone, the dispenser of the olive in your five
o'clock martini that is really a transmitter.
Moreover, in the past informational privacy has not been a
major concern because it has been protected by a number of fac-
tors unrelated to technology. Large quantities of information
about individuals simply have not been available, and the data
that has been available has been difficult to procure without the
type of investigation into an individual's career that Mr. Pember-
ton described earlier. Typically, information has been decen-
tralized; it has been highly superficial in character; and access
to it has been difficult to procure. In addition, we live in a mo-
bile society in which people are very difficult to keep track of,
and recorded information often is difficult to locate. Finally,
by-and-large, most people are unable to interpret and infer re-
vealing information from the data they can get.
Now, I think this is the point at which I depart somewhat
from Professor Ruggles' analysis. As he points out, there is little
doubt that we have a highly imperfect system today in terms of
our files and confidentiality. Neither the federal government
nor the states has done an effective job of protecting us against
the intruders in our society. A reading of the hearings held by
Senator Long's Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and
Procedure and Congressman Gallagher's Special Subcommittee
on Privacy reveals that snoopers have used a variety of elec-
tronic gadgets and more traditional methods to turn our society
into a transparent world. Nonetheless, I don't think that the
current unsatisfactory situation regarding privacy invasions by
traditional means should obscure the fact that the computer adds
an entirely new dimension to the privacy problem, and I'd like
to spend a few minutes describing some of the peculiar privacy
concerns raised by the computer.
Ever since the federal government entered into the taxation
and social welfare spheres in the 1920's and 1930's, greater quan-
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tities of information have been sought from citizens and corpora-
tions. Moreover, in addition to the normal governmental pro-
cesses of gathering information, in recent years access to govern-
ment employment and other forms of governmental largess in-
creasingly has depended upon a willingness to divulge private
information. In other words, we are being compelled to give
the government and other data collecting agencies information
that traditionally we were not obliged to reveal. Furthermore,
as recording processes have become cheaper and more efficient,
the tendency toward information gathering has intensified and
has been accompanied by a tendency toward centralization and
collation. I think we are witnessing something akin to a Parkin-
son's law, which can be stated as follows: As capacity for in-
formation handling increases, there is a tendency to engage in
more extensive manipulation and analysis of reported data, which
in turn motivates the collection of data pertaining to a larger
number of variables.
I think that at this point in time the computer is the key-
stone to the continued application of this form of Parkinson's law.
Perhaps the best example of this trend and the relevance of the
computer is provided by the census proposed for 1970. The 1970
census asks numerous questions, some of which contain one or
more subquestions and many of which are highly personal in
nature. For example: How many showers have you in your
home? How many beds do you have in your house? Is your
home subject to a mortgage? How do you heat your home?
How many children have you had, including stillborn (this is
asked of females)? What were you doing in April, 1960? The
1970 census represents a continuation of the trend toward longer
and more complex questionnaires. It seems to me obvious that
the availability of high speed, relatively inexpensive machine
processing acts as an incentive to this continued proliferation of
the census.
Yet the Constitution, which authorizes the census, doesn't say
anything about gathering information concerning showers, beds,
personal finances, modes of transportation, and many of the
other subjects covered by the proposed questions. I am not
suggesting that the government does not have a legitimate need
for this information, because the case can be documented for
the utility for most of the sought-after information. The further
and more significant question, however, at least in my mind, is
what price are we willing to pay in terms of citizen privacy to
allow the government to get some of this information?
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If we assume an increasing level of information gathering
and processing on the part of the government and the more ex-
tensive use of computers and machine handling of data, I think
we can posit that the following risks, which exist under current
information handling techniques, will be increased: errors in
reporting, recording, and indexing data; abuse of information by
persons working with the data; misuse by people who are at a
distance from the data, but who can gain access to it through re-
mote terminals and modern communication techniques; and fi-
nally what may be the most disturbing risk of all, the violation of
an individual's understanding that the information he discloses
to a particular governmental agency for a particular purpose will
be used only by that agency and only for that purpose. The
Census Bureau does a marvelous job but it simply does not have
control over the individual census taker who goes door to door
and acquiesces when one interviewee asks, "say, how did my
neighbor Mrs. Jones answer that question about the size of her
mortgage?" Unfortunately, in many instances there tends to be
a free-wheeling communal discussion of the responses to the
questionnaires.
There are additional risks to widespread use of data centers.
As information accumulates, the contents of a dossier appears
more impressive and there tends to be an increased reliance on
information in a dossier despite what may be the basic softness
of some of its contents. Our success or failure in life ultimately
may turn on what other people put into our computer file, and
on an unknown programmer's ability, or perhaps his inability,
to evaluate, process, and interrelate information. The electronic
record of our endeavors may become a hearsay narrative pre-
pared by a "computernik" much the way our knowledge of the
Trojan War and the travails of Ulysses has depended in the main
on Homer's filtration of earlier chronicles.
The centralization of information from widely divergent sec-
tors of the government or private industry or academe-the last
by the way having an extensive amount of financial, medical,
and personal information about students and faculty-also cre-
ates problems of information accuracy. At this juncture I am
not talking of the literal accuracy of the data; I am talking
about contextual accuracy. Information can be entirely ac-
curate and sufficient in one context, and very misleading or in-
complete in another context. For example, consider a bare state-
ment of marital status-married, divorced, separated, or single.
Consider the significance and different connotations of each of
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these words when examined from the perspective of selective
service, a credit bureau, internal revenue, immigration and nat-
uralization, social security, or an insurance company.
The problem of context may be graphically presented by
looking at one of the most dangerous records being maintained
in our society-the unexplained and incomplete arrest record.
Consider the citizen whose computerized central file, accessible
to law enforcement agencies throughout the land, contains the
entry, "arrested June 1, 1942, convicted felony January 1, 1943,
sentenced 21/2 years Leavenworth." Is it likely that this man is
going to get federal employment, or be accorded the same bene-
fits and courtesies that many of us receive from the federal gov-
ernment? Yet I have just read to you a shortened form of the
arrest record of a man convicted of being a conscientious objec-
tor during World War II. I would hate to see that type of an
entry dredged up from the past and put in a centralized file with
no concern for who may have access to that file, for its accuracy,
or for many other problems and complications.
I would like to present one last, well, second-from-the-last
potential "horrible" from the computerized future. As I said at
the outset, a computer is not simply a machine in a fixed position
in a building. It can be that, but it often will be much more. It
can also be the heart of a surveillance system. Thumbing
through the reports issued by Senator Long's Subcommittee, one
finds marvelous testimony concerning activities in the United
States Post Office. Not only do they get the mail to you but
on occasion it is given very special handling in the process.
The special treatment is known as the "mail-cover operation."
It is a technique for watching suspected Communists, tax delin-
quents, "undesirables," and, well, we don't know who else. How
does it work? A Federal Investigator from the FBI, Treasury De-
partment, or perhaps Narcotics Bureau, is stationed at the Post
Office that processes your mail. He just watches the mail ad-
dressed to you and the mail being sent by you. He lists the
people you write to, and lists the people who write to you. They
want to see who you bank with, what stock brokerage house
you have, who your friends are, and anything else that might
turn up. Actually it's a terribly costly surveillance process.
Well, some day in the near future we will have fully opera-
tional optical scanners, which are electronic devices that can
recognize and transmit images or information about characters
on a page much the way camera lenses or eyes can. When this
day arrives, we can replace our human agent at the Post Office
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with an optical scanner that gazes down at your mail as it is
processed and immediately records the information that is on
the envelope-the names and addresses of sender and recipi-
ent-transmits the data through the telephone system or micro-
wave relay into the central data bank where it is translated into
machine readable information and automatically enters it into
the files of the people corresponding with the suspect. All this is
entirely feasible once we get a fully operational optical scanner.
The Post Office Department in Detroit currently is experimenting
with such a device. The official word is that it is just for read-
ing zip codes, but obviously the potential for snooping is enor-
mous.
Finally, I think we have to recognize the fact that a certain
element in our population, I won't even begin to guess what
percentage, views the development of computer technology, the
spawning of data banks, and the use of identification numbers as
firm evidence of the increasing de-humanization of man and the
increasing de-humanization of American society. These people
are becoming active in an attempt to retard this trend. Rebel-
lions against the use of telephone area codes have occurred, zip
code numbers are ignored, and I wish I had a dollar for every
computer punch card that has been intentionally folded, spindled,
or mutilated contrary to its express directions. I leave to the psy-
chologists and the sociologists the task of evaluating how serious
a problem this really is. To date very little has been done in the
way of research on the subject of the interaction among privacy,
the computer, and social environment.
As a footnote to this point let me add that we also should be
aware of the fact that increased government surveillance, and I'm
using surveillance in the broadest sense and to cover all aspects
of the increased pressure to extract information from the citi-
zenry and the taking away of an individual's right to control in-
formation about himself, all are bound to have repercussions in
terms of our individual conception of what our government is all
about. Here again, don't misread me. I'm not predicting 1984,
although others see it as a real possibility. I call your attention
to a recent editorial in the Saturday Review that carried the
headline, "1984, Minus 16 and Counting." I do suggest, however,
that we must take account of the pressures on privacy caused by
information gathering and data banks and if we are serious about
our government being a form of benevolent, outer-directed, so-
cial control, I think we have a lot of fences to mend in this
regard.
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I have spent a great deal of time simply describing some of
the risks of data centers; Mr. Ruggles has previously suggested
some of the pathways for protection. At this time, I would like
to second these suggestions because I am not, as I said at the
outset, arguing against data centers; I am arguing against the
irrational, unstructured growth of data centers and pleading for
a maximum intellectual input into the question of the impact
these data centers may have on our traditional notions of privacy.
And that, of course, is what I think this symposium is all about.
How can we guarantee individual privacy and at the same time
not deprive ourselves of the wonders of this new technology:
Hopefully, we can spend some of the panel time developing this
subject further. As for now, I think I shall halt this stream
of consciousness.
IV. GENERAL COMMENTS
The following comments were made by the participants at the
conclusion of their initial remarks.
(Professor Ruggles) I would like to comment on the use of
the social security number. The assignment of a number to an
individual, I suspect, is going to go out of existence pretty much.
For example, in the Econometric Society we started out com-
puterizing our records by account numbers, but it was so
hard for the girls to learn these or look them up, that we finally
decided we might use names. This turned out quite well, since
the computer can recognize a name as well as a number. Now
it is true that you sometimes have duplicate names. What do
you do about this? Well, you identify them by where they live,
their location and so on. If you have people with the same name
living in the same location, you can add little descriptors like
their age. It is far simpler to use names than numbers and we
may find that the computer instead of mechanizing us further is
going to adapt to us. I agree, however, that when records are
kept by name and the computer has access to them the privacy
problem is much more serious.
Now as to the question of whether the computer has ex-
panded our information, in 1940 I purchased from the Census
what I thought to be a duplicate set of punch cards of the 1940
census with all the questions asked. There were some 40 items.
(Actually, the number of demographic items collected on a 100
per cent basis in our census is not a 100, it's six. All of the
rest are on a sample basis. It is just too expensive to collect
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all this data on everybody. We also do a 25 per cent sam-
ple on housing and other things which give us a wider base of
information.) I thought I was purchasing a duplicate deck.
They were very cagey; they sold me the originals. And for
many years I kept these up at Yale in 96 cartons. There were
over a million cards, and just this last week the Cowles Foun-
dation said they needed more room and asked me to please
get them out. Now they are being put on tape, but this just
shows how the data does hang on-even pre-computer. As for
the scanning of the Post Office, I agree that this is of the same
nature as wire-tapping, and if we outlaw wire-tapping, we
should probably outlaw this practice too. But I do not feel this
has anything to do with the problem of centralizing information.
This is just a practice which new technology makes possible on a
partial basis, namely in the Post Office Department, and informa-
tion so acquired can feed into a decentralized FBI file as well as a
centralized one. The fold-bend-mutilate sort of thing is, of
course, done on a non-technological basis by students who write
exams for me. Every now and then the writing becomes so
illegible that I can't possibly make out what the student is saying.
Naturally, he hopes I will give him the benefit of the doubt and
not mark him down. If I did he would come back and say,
"See this is exactly what I said." So trying to 'mess up the
system' works at all levels.
One final word. Originally I opposed the term "data bank"
because it was so much like a data morgue. But the more I
think of it, the more I think that this is an appropriate term,
for this reason. With an account in a bank, you can put money
in and you can draw money out, other people can put money in
and draw it out, the bank is pretty careful that you do not
draw somebody else's money out. Similarly, there has to be some
sort of regulation as to how things go in to the account, what is
acceptable, what your credit rating is and so on and so forth. It
does seem to me that if we adopted the policy of not allowing
any of the major agencies to keep their own records, but rather
required them to deposit their information into a central file
and then to draw it out according to their need, this might be a
better process.
The New York State Identification and Intelligence system
does, in fact, operate on this principle. Prior to the establish-
ment of this system there were seventy million files in the
New York State System. Some 3,700 agencies kept individual
files, and employed some 66,000 individuals. Eight million
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searches of these files were made each year for some three
million violations. So it was a large business. When they had
the Appalachia Raid and tried to get information on one in-
dividual, they found that in the neighboring communities within
100 miles there were over 200 separate files on him. What do
these files contain? Well, they are kept by Police Departments
and so on, and mainly contain newspaper clippings, partial ar-
rest records, interviews, rumors, and little slips of paper. Much
of this information would not be sufficiently respectable to put
in a system.
The New York Identification and Intelligence System rep-
resented a new non-operating agency that took information as
it was generated by the various groups and retrieved it for agen-
cies when the request was proper. Eventually it will cover not
only police files but those of the courts, etc.
Not all information is proper to give out for various pur-
poses. However, from the point of view of civil rights the
New York System is a tremendous advance, because it means
accurate, up to date information can be provided for the use
that is required. This has meant, I believe, that many people
are released on recognizance because an examination shows that
they have no prior record. Therefore, you do not have to put
them in jail while you investigate to see whether you can let
them out on bail. So, in fact, there has been a great deal of im-
provement, and I believe the number of people released without
being jailed has gone up considerably since the system has been
adopted.
(Mr. Pemberton) It occurs to me to add, first, that I think
that it was appropriate for Professor Miller to inject new prob-
lems with respect to surveillance into this discussion of the prob-
lems of keeping and disseminating information. I would like to
use an example other than the Post Office scanner to make the
point. Currently the United States Senate is debating what
started out to be the Administration's Safe Streets and Crime
Bill. The Administration, far from advocating new authority for
law enforcement agencies to wire-tap and to engage in electronic
bugging surveillance, advocated new regulations to control wire-
tapping and electronic bugging. The Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee rewrote the Administration's bill to put in what they claimed
would be a controlled wire-tap section, an authorization to law
enforcement agencies (federal by virtue of the federal act, state
by virtue of permission granted in the proposed federal act to
state legislatures) to authorize control of wire-tapping. Far
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from being actually controlled it would be an "open sesame" to
all kinds of presently unauthorized means of electronic surveil-
lance of individuals by law enforcement agencies. Far from com-
plying with the Administration's request that new techniques for
electronic surveillance be met with new laws to protect privacy
against these new techniques, the Senate Judiciary Committee
has recommended to the Senate that entirely new authority be
granted in derogation of the very simple prohibition against
wire-tapping in the Communications Act of 1934, and further that
broad new authority be granted for official wire-tapping.
I'm suggesting that to the extent concerns for privacy, aris-
ing out of the existence of new techniques for invading privacy,
do not prevail in the current legislative debate, we may be legiti-
mately alarmed about insensitivity to these very human values
when it comes to the regulation of collection and dissemination
of data and data banks. I would like to suggest also, without
impnging on Professor Miller's promise of recommendations, also
that the presence of new techniques in data gathering and dis-
semination warrants regulation of private and government data
gathering and dissemination as well as government data banks.
Let me suggest that credit data gathering and reporting
goes relatively unregulated in our society today, but it is not a
centralized business. If one credit agency makes a disastrous
mistake about me, I might possibly be able to get credit from
another source that is dealing with a credit agency that doesn't
have that derogatory information. If this is centralized, with all
of the information about me in one computer in New York, and
every credit extending agency can obtain information about me,
the danger of damage, irrevocable damage, is considerably
greater. It seems to me it is totally warranted, particularly where
interstate commerce in credit information dissemination is in-
volved, for new regulations to require that such private endeav-
ors have procedures to insure fairness.
(Professor Miller) I'm afraid I have some bad news for
you. The Credit Bureau of America and IBM are developing
a computer-based national credit rating system while we sit here
and talk. The retail Credit Bureau of Greater New York has
records on eight million people in the greater New York area-
credit records. They're not computerized as yet, but they will
be in the near future-all information agencies are going to be
computerized. Each year this credit bureau enters into its file
750,000 derogatory items about one or more of the eight million
strap-hangers in New York. Now, you might not be impressed
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with this statistic. After all, New York is a large and supposedly
evil place. Maybe there are 750,000 bad items about its citizenry.
But then you start looking at a breakdown of these items to find
out what they are. You discover that the largest single com-
ponent is an item of about 250,000 entries noting the initiation
of law suits against one or more of the eight million people
upon whom files are maintained. We all know that a lawsuit,
such as a divorce action, or a landlord-tenant squabble, or an
automobile accident case, can adversely affect an individual's
credit rating or chances of employment, but does this organiza-
tion check the denouement of each of the lawsuits to protect those
individuals who successfully defend against them? No, sir. Only
the entries dealing with the commencement of the lawsuits are
recorded. The fact that the vast majority of these actions are
never prosecuted or result in a vindication of the defendant is
unreported.
This illustrates the type of sloppy procedure and lack of
sensitivity that we have to be aware of and guard against; and
I guess I'm afraid that the New York State Identification and In-
telligence System referred to earlier by Professor Ruggles has
not overwhelmed me with its sensitivity. One of the first public
pronouncements made by its management, indeed a public pro-
nouncement that was repeated before Senator Long's Subcom-
mittee, was the boast that it was going to interconnect and ex-
change information with other criminal law enforcement offices
in the United States. This worries me because I don't trust the
quality of a substantial portion of the information gathering in
most police bureaus. Indeed, I don't even trust the information
gatherers in my own law school, because they make mistakes
and often are callous or indifferent to the rights of individuals
and ignorant of the ways in which information can injure people.
Let me just add one further dimension to this problem since
a question has been raised regarding what originally was called
the Right of Privacy Act of 1967, which I fear ultimately will
prove to be a tragic piece of reactionary legislation. The com-
puter-privacy issue and the National Data Center should not be
viewed in isolation but rather in terms of the overall develop-
ment in our society of the concept of privacy. By the way, I
think the heated debate over whether to establish a National
Data Center is a red herring. As a practical matter some system
is bound to be developed, although I think enough people have
expressed concern so that when it is created there is going to be a
reasonable degree of attention to protecting privacy. Actually, a
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form of National Data Center has already been established. All
you have to do is look at the report recently put out by Senator
Long's Committee on the dossiers currently maintained by fed-
eral agencies, and you realize that the government has a vast
amount of information on each of us that is available throughout
the government and to others. Inevitably, each information gath-
ering agency will put its data in a form that is compatible with
the form used by other agencies, and information interchange
will be accomplished through dial access telephones. This, in
effect, will create a National Data Center.
In considering the fate of informational privacy in this coun-
try, we must take account of trends other than the National Data
Center. A good example of what we must be concerned with is
the proliferation of non-federal data systems, such as those being
developed in the insurance and credit fields. Information gath-
erers in these industries investigate a number of private matters
that are deemed relevant to mortality risks and credit worthiness,
such as extra-marital relations, homosexuality, and outdoor sport-
ing activities. Increasingly, this data is finding its way into
computers and more and more these computers are being tied
together in networks, which facilitates maximum dissemination
of the collected data. In the academic community, each year
bigger and better files are developed on students. In every
quadrant of industry, tremendous quantities of personal infor-
mation are being preserved. These data centers will present the
really significant problems of computer-based information and
privacy in the future. My concern about these centers is in-
tensified because of two recent developments in the law of pri-
vacy.
One is the Freedom of Information Act of 1966. That title
is a beautiful euphemism. The Freedom of Information Act
means that a great number of people have freedom of access to
information about you. It's a legislative statement that an ex-
tensive amount of the material in governmental files is now
available for public view. Now there was a very, very solid
justification for enacting this statute. In the past many regula-
tory agencies have been very secretive about what is in their
files and what the rules of the game were-they have exhibited
what may be termed sort of bureaucratic anal retentiveness. The
Freedom of Information Act is designed to let the public in to see
what these agencies are doing. Among other things, however, it
provides that people can examine your files in a number of fed-
eral agencies as long as access is not covered by specific confiden-
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tiality statutes or unless entry to your file would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy, and that's approxi-
mately the statutory language.
In other words, the statute represents a complete reversal of
the traditional presumption in favor of individual privacy. The
individual whose dossier has been opened is obliged to prove
that entry into his file would be a clearly unwarranted invasion
of his privacy. The difficulty is that when somebody delves into
another person's records, the latter rarely is told of that fact. So
that even when an individual could establish his right to privacy,
he may never get the opportunity to do so because he will not
know it has been invaded. That is item one.
Item two is a decision by the Supreme Court in 1967 in a
case entitled Time, Incorporated v. Hill. It involved a play called
"The Desperate Hours," which dealt with the travails of a family
held captive by three escaped convicts. After the play opened on
Broadway, LIFE magazine wrote an article about it stating that
it was a re-creation of the story of Jessie Hill who had under-
gone a similar, but not identical, experience some years earlier.
Hill sued, arguing that LiFE had invaded his privacy; that the
experience had been a terrible one and that he had moved from
Pennsylvania to Connecticut to forget about it; and that the
LIFE magazine article had dredged it out of obscurity and made
him look ridiculous in the eyes of his community.
Hill won in the trial court and was awarded damages.
However, the Supreme Court of the United States, on appeal,
held that because the first amendment needs "breathing space,"
the law cannot recognize a right of privacy in the context of
speech by communications media, even when the disseminator
erroneously reports the story, unless the erroneous report is
issued willfully. Although I have been very simplistic and
sketchy in my description of the case, I think it is fair to say that
the net effect of the decision is to impair the vitality of the
right of privacy in this country.
Another item worth mentioning is the trend I mentioned
in my earlier statement-the increase in recent years in infor-
mation gathering, which will be accelerated by computer-based
interconnected networks. If you tie the fact that more informa-
tion is being gathered by the government with the enactment of
the Freedom of Information Act, which permits more people to
gain access to it, and add Time, Incorporated v. Hill, which held
that you may be negligent when you use it, you get some sense of
the dimensions of the threat to privacy in this country. All of
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these trends must be looked at as a unit because their confluence
represents a terrifying specter.
I am beginning to have serious doubts as to the ability of
the right of individual privacy to survive in our society unless
we start taking stock of the threat and start doing things along
the lines suggested in the original Right of Privacy Act. Un-
fortunately, that proposal, which was designed to cut down wire-
tapping, has been transformed into an act that is going to au-
thorize increased wire-tapping. The sad thing about the Right of
Privacy Act is not only the fact that its original purpose has
been subverted, but also that it never really came to grips with
the problems of information privacy.
(Mr. Pemberton) I agree with Professor Miller and genu-
inely fear that the massive assault on privacy that the confluence
of several trends seems to be bringing about at the moment will
have to be dealt with by legislation, and not merely by piece-
meal accretion of law through individual cases.
(Professor Miller) I think it's very clear that if we sit back
and await a case-by-case shifting in the law of privacy, and
the adjustment between the right of privacy and the first
amendment, we may come to grief before change takes place.
In light of the movements in the technology, this process is just
too slow. What we need at this point is a total and complete
legislative revamping of all phases of the regulations regarding
governmental and nongovernmental information gathering, proc-
essing, manipulating, and storing. At present we have a crazy
quilt of legislative regulation with too many pieces dealing with
small aspects of the information gathering process and with-
out any rational overall program. Many of the statutes are in-
consistent; they don't cover all the cases and problems that may
arise; and they don't take into account the massive shifts in in-
formation technology and the new threats they pose.
We need a total and complete revamping of our legislative
approach to informational privacy, including the regulation of
computer transmissions and the movement of information in in-
terstate commerce. We have to think about encoding and
scrambling computerized data; transmission line priorities; and
make sure that there isn't wire-tapping of computer lines, which
is just as feasible as wire-tapping of telephone lines. Beyond this
we simply must regulate the character of information that private
agencies can collect. It is necessary to make sure that credit
agencies and insurance companies achieve a minimal level of
ethical activity in the gathering of information.
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The entire spectrum of computer hardware and software
manufacturing someday will have to come under regulation,
especially since so many systems operate today on a time share
basis. These systems present a high risk of monitor intrusion and
file stealing because frequently 20 or more different sources
input and output data to and from the same computer. Ulti-
mately it may be necessary for the federal government to estab-
lish minimal levels of privacy controls in the manufacturing of
computers. This is a massive problem that presently is being
pecked at by a lot of different people, but I really think that the
time has come for some foundation or the American Law Insti-
tute to step in and do a complete study.
(Question): The panel seems to have been unanimous in ac-
cepting the notion that data banks are desirable, and I'd like to
brave the question as to whether they really are. I want to
preface this by saying that if you want to get information about
households or individuals say in Minneapolis, it has to be com-
plete if it is to be useful. I submit that it has to fit the specific
purpose. It should be accurate and it should cover all periods of
time. So I raise the question of whether, even given the capac-
ity of modern computers, it is feasible to create a data bank that
will fit these characteristics you've concepted. And then sec-
ondly, whether it is as efficient as the present data collection
from statistical investigation, where you tailor the investigation
to specific purposes.
(Professor Ruggles) Analysis of information is a complex
sort of thing, but much of our information tells us a great deal.
For example, supposing we are studying migration-some of our
best records might well be social security records which provide
an individual's changes in address. Now if you went out to col-
lect and analyze data on migration all over the United States,
the cost of making comprehensive surveys which contain the same
information as social security records contain would be horren-
dous.
A number of "matching" studies have been done by census to
provide social and demographic information such as death or
juvenile delinquency. In other words, the files are set up in
such a way that you very often can add information. Much of
the information that you say might be collected separately,
such as school records and so on, already exists, and our com-
puter capabilities are such today that being able to relate and
match the different kinds of information makes it possible to do
studies that we never conceived of before.
19681
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Let me just cite one case in point: "establishment" data
collected by the Census Bureau. When they started putting
this on computer tape it became possible to pick up the same
establishment year after year and provide a case history. You
could examine, for example, the change in wages in various
kinds of establishments, and get some understanding as to how
much of the wage change in our economy is due to expansion in
the higher wage firms because of greater productivity and the
discontinuance of this information can be compared with the
wage changes taking place in any single firm. To design this
information comprehensively for all industries and all regions
of the United States is just beyond our capabilities. We have to
use a by-product of the system itself.
(Question): Does the right of privacy exist at all? . . . as a
constitutional right?
(Mr. Pemberton) Does it exist at all as a constitutional right?
I don't think we really know. There is language by Justice
Douglas in the Griswold v. Connecticut opinion-that is the
Connecticut contraception case-which tries to piece some sort
of a right to privacy out of certain portions of the Bill of Rights.
But there is also language in some of the more recent wire-
tapping cases that seems to run a little bit against the recog-
nition of the broad-gauged total individual right to privacy. I
don't think we really know, at least I certainly am not capable
of saying yes or no. I think it is in flux at the moment.
(Professor Miller) Could I supplement that simply by sug-
gesting that I think that a number of separate rights of privacy
exist rather than a single comprehensive right of privacy as the
question may have suggested. Specific rights to certain kinds of
privacy have existed in our legal system for a long time. For
instance, the fourth amendment's guarantee against unreason-
able searches and seizures is a very explicit guarantee of a kind
of a right of privacy and it appears in the Bill of Rights itself.
The old law tended to rely largely on property concepts to
protect privacy. This is one reason that Eighteenth Century
libertarians tended to respect highly the institution of private
property. But some kinds of demographic, economic, and tech-
nological changes have made property less relevant in protecting
privacy. The capacity to eavesdrop electronically is the most
dramatic instance of that. If you cease viewing privacy as a sin-
gle broad-gauge right similar to free speech you discover that our
system has had a high respect for privacy in the past-although
not always going under that name-and it is a genuine fear that
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we are expressing here today; that our system is abandoning to-
day a great proportion of the congeries of values that we associate
under the heading of privacy.
(Question) We have been using the word "information"
quite readily throughout our discussion and I am wondering if
the solution is anywhere near the real problem. I have been look-
ing at the crutches that we have been establishing relative to the
gathering of information as probably being a bigger problem
than the gathering of this information itself. In other words, I
am wondering about such things as wire-tapping. I can see a
group such as this in 1960 B.C. discussing the same type of prob-
lem. We didn't have the computer then. We would be discuss-
ing how one person could gather information about another by
looking in the window, or by transferring data between two
people, and we would be questioning what kinds of data he
should pass. For example, a minister or priest would have the
right to know that a person was committing adultery or was
stealing from his neighbor.
So way back then we had a problem of information gathering
about which I am sure there was a group discussing whether
they had the right to invade the individual's private life. We
have gone through the ages without a computer, but we have
had this information gathering problem and there has always
existed the danger of twisted terms and abuses by some people.
Now people have dispersed and we have a little more privacy.
I was just wondering whether the information gathering prob-
lem was the wrong area, and if we should be looking rather at
the legality of the erroneous data that is being gathered, and
concentrate on the legality of protecting the individuals.
(Professor Miller) This is a statement of another approach
to the problem, which when added to or in combination with the
first approach makes the scheme more effective.
(Question) What can be done to protect the individual pri-
vacy from a bad credit record or a bad civil service record?
(Professor Miller) Actually, I haven't addressed myself di-
rectly to the techniques of protecting privacy against the com-
puter previously because I thought that it really has been brought
out by the three speakers in pieces. If you are looking for Nir-
vana, forget it! If you are looking for a way to sterilize the
human race so they don't do any bad things with computerized
information, forget it! It can't be done. There always will be
an evil programmer just as there are bad lawyers, bad econo-
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mists, and bad businessmen who can negate the most carefully
conceived protective system.
We have already had experience with this in the program-
ming business. There is a classic case, perhaps apocryphal, of a
programmer for a large retailing concern who was doing the
programming for the company's payroll. As she was setting up
the program for the computerized production of the checks she
added a series of commands that directed the machine to send
her a payroll check every 18 minutes. Unfortunately, she fell
victim to the "pig at the trough" doctrine. She was appre-
hended because the postman got very tired, and somewhat sus-
picious, of the enormous collection of mail, obviously containing
checks, and he caused an inquiry to be made by the company.
All we can do is play the probabilities in developing controls.
First and foremost we need controls on input, and this is pre-
cisely what Professor Ruggles has previously addressed himself
to, and Mr. Pemberton has supported him. There is so much in-
formation about people that we could collect and in time it will
be economical to collect it in view of the fact that computer
costs are constantly declining. But in the case of certain types
of sensitive data, we just shouldn't collect it-period! More-
over, we have to start developing a professional cadre in the
programming field. After all, we specially train and we license
a variety of professions and trades. We have to do the same
with programmers who are going to deal with sensitive or per-
sonal information.
Another area of protection is controlling access to the data;
in many contexts it is essential to identify and limit those who
can get into the data bank. This ultimately will be done by using
voice prints or finger prints as access keys or identification pro-
cedures. We should have a system for monitoring the files
whereby anyone who enters or interrogates the system leaves
evidence of that fact. Perhaps the system can be designed to
record the information that Sam Slick entered the system at 8:18
on such and such a date, that he used the files for a stated num-
ber of minutes, and that he looked at and made entries in the
files of Bob Boyscout and Dan Dedicated. These records could
be periodically monitored to see if any suspicious pattern of
abuse is revealed.
We also should give each individual access to his own file
and create some type of an administrative structure to enable
him to challenge the accuracy of those files. Admittedly such a
system would be costly. The FBI and the CIA will be upset and
[Vol. 53:211
1968] COMPUTERS AND PRIVACY 245
moan, "Gee, how are we going to catch Communists, subversives
and criminals if we have to reveal all our information?" Some-
body else will complain that such a system will result in an end-
less flow of petty squabbles about the accuracy of the files.
Obviously, some accommodations can be made. Cost can be
reduced by sending citizens a print-out of their National Data
Center file along with their tax forms. There are a number of
other things that can be done to facilitate and keep the cost of
preserving privacy down but, unfortunately, things will never be
perfect.

